Single storey rear extension Decision
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Inspector’s Reasoning
Appeal Decision
Site visit made on 10 June 2026
by K Lancaster BA (hons) MSc MRTPI
an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State
Decision date: 14 July 2026
Appeal Ref: 6006479
74 Richmond Avenue, Grappenhall And Thelwall, Warrington WA4 2NX
• The appeal is made under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended)
against a refusal to grant approval required under Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part 1, Class A of the
Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended ).
• The appeal is made by Zoe McGuinness against the decision of Warrington Borough Council.
• The application Ref is 2026/00106/HPA.
• The development proposed is a single storey rear extension
Decision
1. The appeal is dismissed.
Applications for costs
2. An application for costs was made by Zoe McGuinness against Warrington
Borough Council and is the subject of a separate decision.
Background and Main Issue
3. Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part 1, Class A of the Town and Country Planning
(General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended) (GPDO),
grants planning permission for the enlargement of a dwellinghouse, subject to
specified limitations and conditions.
4. Where an application is made for a determination as to whether prior approval is
required for development exceeding the limits in paragraph A.1(f), but permitted by
paragraph A.1(g), paragraph A.4(3) provides that the local planning authority may
refuse prior approval where it considers that the development would not comply
with the relevant conditions, limitations or restrictions.
5. Therefore, the main issue in this appeal is whether the development would be
granted planning permission by Article 3, Schedule 2, Part 1, Class A of the
GPDO.
Reasons
6. The proposal is for a single storey rear extension which would extend from the rear
wall by 4 metres, with an overall height of 4 metres. Prior approval was sought on
the basis that the proposed extension would comply with the requirements of
Schedule 2, Part 1, Class A(g) of the GDPO.
7. There is no dispute that the proposal would comply with the dimensional limitations
of Class A, paragraph A.1(g), and I understand that no objections were received
from neighbouring occupiers. However, the Council refused prior approval on the
Appeal Decision: 6006479
2
basis that a condition attached to the original planning permission1 for the dwelling
removed permitted development rights. Consequently, the Council considers that
express planning permission, rather than prior approval under permitted
development rights, is required.
8. Condition No. 6 of planning permission ref: 80/9913 states that “No development
of the type referred to in Class I(1) and (2) and Class II(1) of the First Schedule of
the Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1977 is to be carried
out without the specific permission of the LPA”.
9. Class I(1) of Schedule 1 of the Town and Country Planning General Permitted
Development Order 1977 relates to the enlargement, improvement or other
alteration of a dwellinghouse; Class I(2), relates to the erection or construction of a
porch outside an external door; and Class II(1), relates to the erection or
construction of gates, fences, walls or other means of enclosure, all subject to
specified conditions.
10. Although the GPDO has been amended and revised on multiple occasions since
1977, the types of development described above remain broadly comparable in in
scope to those within the current iteration of the GPDO. Whilst some criteria have
changed, the essential nature of the development types has not. Therefore, the
condition is capable of applying to the form of development that is the subject of
this appeal.
11. The appellant highlights the fact that the Council has been unable to produce the
approved drawings or site location plan associated with planning permission
80/9913 and so has not demonstrated that the condition removing permitted
development rights actually relates to the appeal property. The Council accepts
that further records are unavailable due to the incorrect destruction of records.
12. Whilst this is regrettable, the Council has confirmed that planning permission
80/9913 is plotted against the housing estate on its internal system and there is no
substantive evidence before me to indicate that the Council has identified the
incorrect planning history for the appeal site. Nor has alternative evidence been
provided to demonstrate that the condition does not apply. In the absence of such
evidence, I have no reason to depart from the Council’s position.
13. The appellant suggests that the removal of permitted development rights is not
reasonable or necessary. However, this appeal relates to a refusal of prior
approval. It does not provide a mechanism to review, vary or remove an existing
planning condition. The issue before me is therefore limited to whether such a
condition exists and whether it restricts the permitted development rights in
question.
14. On the evidence before me, I find that a condition exists which removes permitted
development rights for development of the type proposed. Accordingly, the
proposal would not constitute permitted development under the GPDO.
15. My attention has been drawn to an application relating to a neighbouring property,
76 Richmond Avenue which was granted prior approval2 in March 2017 for a
single storey rear extension. An application for a lawful development certificate3
1 Planning Application Ref: 80/9913
2 Planning Application Ref: 2017/29816
3 Planning Application Ref: 2017/30582
Appeal Decision: 6006479
3
was also granted for this property in 2017. The appellant also refers to an
application4 made in relation to 63 Richmond Avenue, which sought prior approval
for a side extension. This application was also granted.
16. Whilst this suggests some inconsistency in decision-making, each case must be
considered on its own merits, having regard to the evidence available. Therefore,
the existence of other permissions does not alter the facts and planning history
that have been presented in this case.
17. For these reasons, I conclude that the development would not benefit from
permitted development rights, and prior approval cannot be granted.
Conclusion
18. For the above reasons, and having had regard to all other matters raised, I
conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.
K Lancaster
INSPECTOR
4 Planning Application Ref: 2025/00500/CLDP
£
Costs decision section
Costs Decision
Site visit made on 10 June 2026
by K Lancaster BA (hons) MSc MRTPI
an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State
Decision date: 14 July 2026
Costs application in relation to Appeal Ref: 6006479
74 Richmond Avenue, Grappenhall And Thelwall, Warrington WA4 2NX
• The application is made under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, sections 78, 322 and
Schedule 6, and the Local Government Act 1972, section 250(5).
• The application is made by Zoe McGuinness for a full award of costs against Warrington Borough
Council.
• The appeal was against the refusal of prior approval required under Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part
1, Class A of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order
2015 (as amended) for a single storey rear extension.
Decision
1. The application for an award of costs is refused.
Reasons
2. Parties in planning appeals normally meet their own expenses. However, the
Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) advises that costs may be awarded against a
party who has behaved unreasonably and thereby caused the party applying for
costs to incur unnecessary or wasted expense in the appeal process.
3. The applicant first contends that the Council acted unreasonably in failing to
provide requested documentation, including an approved site location plan and
associated drawings, which they consider necessary to demonstrate that permitted
development rights were removed from the appeal property. The applicant submits
that, in the absence of such information, they are unable to independently verify the
Council’s position
4. The Council acknowledges that it has been unable to provide the requested
documents, explaining that the records for some historic planning decisions are no
longer available due to the incorrect destruction of records. It maintains, however,
that its decision was made on the basis of the information available to it, including
the relevant decision notice, which indicates that permitted development rights
have been removed by condition.
5. Whilst the absence of records is regrettable, this does not in itself amount to
unreasonable behaviour. The Council has provided a reasonable explanation for
the lack of documentation and has relied on the evidence available to it at the time
of making its decision. Importantly, no substantive evidence has been provided to
demonstrate that the Council has identified the wrong planning history for the
appeal site or that the condition does not apply to the appeal property.
Costs Decision 6006479
2
6. Although the provision of additional documentation may have clarified matters
further, I am not persuaded that the Council’s inability to produce such material
constitutes unreasonable behaviour.
7. The applicant also alleges unreasonable behaviour on the basis that the Council
has taken an inconsistent approach to decision-making, referring to other cases in
the locality where prior approval has been granted for similar development.
8. The Council accepts that it may have made incorrect decisions on other
applications. However, it is well established that each case must be determined on
its own merits and specific circumstances. An error in another case does not justify
further erroneous decision-making. Whilst inconsistent decision making is
unfortunate, it does not, in this instance amount to unreasonable behaviour.
9. Reference has also been made to findings of the Local Government Ombudsman
concerning record-keeping failures. Whilst these findings provide context for the
absence of documentation, my consideration is limited to the Council’s conduct in
relation to this appeal.
10. The applicant further refers to the burden of proof, particularly in the context of
lawful development certificates. However, this appeal relates to prior approval
rather than a determination of lawfulness. In any event, for the reasons set out in
the main decision, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the evidence
and facts in this case supports the Council’s position.
11. I have also had regard to the case law1 drawn to my attention by the appellant.
However, based on the submissions provided, it has not been demonstrated that
the Council acted unreasonably in this instance. The Council relied on the evidence
available to it and has not been shown to have withheld information or acted on the
basis of unsupported assumptions.
12. Taking all matters into account, including the unusual circumstances arising from
the absence of historic records, unreasonable behaviour has not been
demonstrated. Consequently, there can be no question that the applicant incurred
unnecessary or wasted expense.
Conclusion
13. I find that unreasonable behaviour resulting in unnecessary or wasted expense, as
described in the PPG, has not been demonstrated. Accordingly, an award of costs
is not justified.
K Lancaster
INSPECTOR
1 Murfitt v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Cambridgeshire DC (1980) 40 P&CR 254; First Secretary of State v
Arun District Council [2006] EWCA Civ 1172; and Impey v Secretary of State for the Environment (1984) 47 P & CR 157
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