Erect a 6 foot fence on the front aspect of the property that borders the main road in place of the existing 1 metre fence and erect a 6 foot gate on the front aspect of the property that borders the main road

Appeal Decision Site visit made on 19 September 2017 by Daniel Hartley BA Hons MTP MBA MRTPI an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Decision date: 25 September 2017 Appeal Ref: APP/N4720/D/17/3178197 Rowley View Cottage, Wetherby Road, Scarcroft, Leeds LS14 3BB  The appeal is made under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against a refusal to grant planning permission.  The appeal is made by Mrs Ranjit Johnson against the decision of Leeds City Council.  The application Ref 17/00727/FU, dated 5 February 2017, was refused by notice dated 28 April 2017.  The development proposed is described as “erect a 6 foot fence on the front aspect of the property that borders the main road in place of the existing 1 metre fence and erect a 6 foot gate on the front aspect of the property that borders the main road”. Decision 1. The appeal is dismissed. Procedural Matter 2. The fence and gate have already been erected. I noticed on my site visit that the part of the fence/gate facing Wetherby Road had been finished in a grey colour. This differs from that shown in the photograph submitted as part of the planning application. For the avoidance of doubt, I have determined the appeal on the basis of the details submitted at planning application stage. Main Issue 3. The main issue is whether or not the proposal preserves or enhances the character or appearance of the Bardsey-cum-Rigton Conservation Area. Reasons Site and Proposal 4. The appeal site fronts Wetherby Road (A58) which is a main vehicular route between Wetherby and Leeds. Detailed plans do not accompany the planning application, but instead the appellant has submitted photographs of the fence and gate, including dimensions. The fence and gate measures about 1.8 metres in height at its highest point and is approximately 11 metres wide. The fence is wooden and close boarded with matching double gates which open inwards. The fence and gate is shown as being stained dark brown and replaces a wooden fence which was about 1 metre in height. Appeal Decision APP/N4720/D/17/3178197 2 Conservation Area 5. The appeal site falls within the Bardsey-cum-Rigton Conservation Area (CA). This part of the CA is characterised by mainly large residential properties set within large and spacious plots. There is mature landscaping both within the residential plots as well as lining the A58 and this adds to the verdant and rural character and appearance of the area. Whilst there are some exceptions, in the main the dominant form of boundary treatment along this part of A58 relates to well established hedgerows. This reinforces the fact that this part of the CA is more rural in character and appearance terms. Indeed, the Bardsey- cum-Rigton Conservation Area Appraisal and Management Plan 2009 (CAAMP) states that “soft landscaping is an important part of the character of the areas. Trees and hedge boundaries are significant”. Collectively, the aforementioned attributes add positively to the character and appearance of the CA. 6. I acknowledge that there was previously a 1 metre high fence erected on the appeal site. However, the appeal fence/gate is much higher than the previous fence and owing to its height, position, length and material has the effect of significantly detracting from the verdant and rural character of the area. When passing the site the development appears in stark contrast to the prevailing and softer boundary treatment along the A58 which mainly either consists of imposing hedgerows/vegetation or very low boundary treatment (e.g. low stone walls) with the trees and vegetation being the dominant feature within the rural setting. The fence/gate appears very urban, intrusive and dominant in the street-scene and does not preserve or enhance the character or appearance of the CA. I reach this view irrespective of the more recent change to a grey colour. 7. In the context of Paragraphs 133 and 134 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework), the harm to the significance of the CA would be less than substantial. The appellant has indicated that the boundary treatment is needed as there have been two occasions of theft at the property. They say that the Police suggested the erection of a higher fence. Furthermore, the appellant has commented that a higher fence/gate is needed in order to ensure that both her son and puppy remain safe. I do not doubt that the fence/gate would improve the security and safety of all occupiers of the appeal property and that it would have some positive effect upon minimising the potential for additional burglaries. However, these are essentially private matters rather than matters of wider public importance. In this sense, there are no public benefits that outweigh the less than substantial harm to the CA. 8. In addition to the above, there may be other options available which would deliver the appellant’s security/safety objectives without causing harm to the CA. I can see no reason, for example, why the planting of a dense semi- mature hedge with mesh fencing at the base, coupled with the possible use of CCTV/enhanced electronic surveillance systems, would not meet the appellant’s overall security and safety requirements. In addition, I noticed on my site visit that there was a gate positioned further into the site which in essence represented a barrier between the area for car parking and the dwelling. I do not know if the appellant has considered the potential for making this more secure. Therefore, whilst the need for the fence/gate is acknowledged, I afford such needs less weight in the overall planning balance as the appellant has not provided me with any compelling evidence to indicate why other less harmful options have been discounted. In any event, the proposal would cause Appeal Decision APP/N4720/D/17/3178197 3 material harm to the character and appearance of the area (including the CA) and this is a matter of overriding importance. 9. For the collective reasons outlined above, I therefore conclude that the proposal would not accord with the design and conservation aims of Policies P10 and P11 of the adopted Leeds Core Strategy 2014; saved Policies GP5 and N25 of the Leeds UDP Review 2006; Policy HDG1 of the Leeds Householder Design Guide 2012; the CAAMP; the Bardsey-cum-Rigton Village Design Statement 2002 and the Framework. Other Matters 10. I acknowledge that there are a limited number of other fences in the area. However, in respect of No 2 Wayside Crescent there is no planning permission for the fence. This fence does look out of place in the context of the wider area and I do not consider that its existence justifies allowing the appeal development. 11. There is a fence next to the appeal property at Grey Thatch, but the Council has confirmed that this does not have planning permission and is the subject of planning enforcement action. Whilst I cannot be certain that this fence would be removed, I afford its existence limited weight given that it does not have planning permission and is the subject of planning enforcement action. Furthermore, when compared to the appeal development, the adverse effects of this fence are mitigated to some extent by the fact that there is some verge planting which partly screens such development. In any event, I have considered the appeal development in the context of the wider environment and have concluded that the proposal would neither preserve nor enhance the character or appearance of the CA. 12. I have taken into account comments made by Councillor Rachael Procter and such comments have already been addressed in the reasoning above. 13. The appellant has made reference to Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998. The refusal of planning permission is a proportionate and necessary approach to the legitimate aim of ensuring that harm to the CA is avoided. The protection of the public interest cannot be achieved by means that are less interfering of the appellant’s human rights. 14. There are no other matters raised which would outweigh or alter my conclusion on the main issue. Conclusion 15. For the reasons outlined above, and taking into account all other matters raised, I conclude that the appeal proposal does not deliver a sustainable form of development. The appeal is therefore dismissed. Daniel Hartley INSPECTOR